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Cultural Changes and the 
Crisis of Politics in 
Post-Modern Society 
Franco Crespi 
In this article I intend to examine some aspects of the cultural 
changes taking place in post-modern society. Assuming a certain 
knowledge of the considerable amount of literature on the subject, 
I will try first to outline briefly the main aspects of the cultural 
changes which help to shed light on the meaning of the present 
crisis of politics. I will then develop some arguments on the pos-
sible new developments of the role of politics in our era. 
The contemporary cultural situation can be analyzed accord-
ing to three main levels. The first level can be described as theoretic 
and is apparent in the crisis of the great totalizing ideologies. 
This crisis is linked, as is well known, to: 
a) the progressive recognition of the limits of knowledge relat-
ed to the development of epistemology of science in its rela-
tionship with empirical experience; 
b) the end, as a result, of thorough investigation of the 
nature of cognitive experience, of metaphysical forms; 
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c) the disappearance of telos, or in other words, the end of 
the great naturalistic-evolutionist visions and the global 
interpretation of history; 
d) the emergence of the irreconcilable character of both the 
existential and the social situation, as a consequence of the 
previous three aspects. 
8 
In the absence of a complete and thorough explanation of exis-
tence, due to the impossibility of taking absolute fundaments or 
final conclusions as reference, the question of the meaning of exis-
tence is left open and a basic contradiction is revealed between 
man's infinite desire and the finite limits of the meaning of real 
experience. God's death marks, in the final analysis, the end also 
of the great secular movements founded on a mystic concept of 
humanity, seen as a unitary organism in constant evolution (cf. 
Crespi 1985a). 
The failure of these perspectives influences in particular the 
progressive shift from concepts directed towards a radical renew-
al of the forms of social life (of a revolutionary-utopistic form) to 
more limited concepts of reform. This is not intended obviously 
as an assertion that in our world there no longer exist active ideo-
logical forces of a totalizing nature, but that these forces appear to 
be in contrast with the main trends of philosophical and scientific 
experience of post-modernity: in this context the totalizing ten-
dencies prove to be regressive expressions, increasingly linked to 
social situations characterized by anomie and emargination. 
The second level is psychosocial and appears to be directly con-
nected to the experience of subjective existence in the new social 
conditions. This is usually expressed in terms of both individual 
and collective identity crisis. The phenomenon of differentiation 
and fragmentation of social life which characterizes the societies 
of late capitalism leads to a plurality of social formations different 
from the traditional ones (family, class, employment, politics, 
etc.), so that social groups and individuals are faced with a 
"growing pluralization of role involvement" (Parsons 1968: 11) 
and the fact that their identity is no longer "the content of a tradi-
tion" (Habermas 1976: 87). The implications of the identity crisis 
which have affected strata, categories, social groups and even 
entire national communities (in countries where the process of 
modernization is fairly recent) are evident, paradoxically, only in 
the accentuation of the difference between society and the indi-
vidual and in the increase of the value attributed to creativity, 
imagination, individual needs, privacy, etc., which characterizes 
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contemporary culture. The claim to an identity and the search for 
identification-through participation in the various social move-
ments, associations, and groups based on race, sex, age, politics, 
religion, various cultural and recreative activities, and sometimes 
even on drugs or violence-is in many respects a new element. 
This is so not only in the forms which identity has assumed, but 
above all because it expresses in a direct way the very need for an 
identity . The priorities of various feminist, homosexual and 
youth movements today are of an ontological nature insofar as 
what is sought more than anything else is a right to an identity, 
while the pursuit of common interests comes only in second place 
(cf. Melucci 1982). The reasons for this phenomenon can be pri-
marily linked to the instability which characterizes positions and 
roles in post-industrial societies which are undergoing continu-
ous, rapid changes : societies in which identities, instead of being 
granted according to birth, objective class membership and territo-
rial bonds, are increasingly the result of choices made at various 
stages during a lifetime, through continuous processes of social-
ization and renegotiation of relationships (cf. Berger 1974: 207; 
Bell 1976; Sciolla 1983; Gallino 1982: 69 ss.). 
It is in this context that the particular relationship which 
exists between identity and the dimension of power becomes evi-
dent both on an individual level-as a problem of interdepen-
dence between personal identity and inner power-and on a 
social level, as the problem of the circular relationship between 
power as producer (or denier) of identity and identity as a form of 
legitimation (or delegitimation) of power, including, naturally, the 
internal connections between these two levels (cf. Robertson & 
Holzner 1980; Crespi 1983). To examine the problem of identity 
mainly in terms of interiorization by the individual of the domi-
nant values and models of the social system, as Parsons did in 
1968, seems today to be altogether inadequate if we take into 
account the fact that the present situation is characterized by the 
plurality of values and models in such a system, by an "excess of 
alternatives" which , in the absence of a strong ego, gives rise to a 
growing "indeterminateness of the collective culture" (Rositi 
1981, 1983). Thus , it appears that in this situation reinforcement 
of identity must not be considered, in the traditional sense, as a 
reinforcement of identifications and social solidarity but, in a 
more problematical way, as the question of how to increase the 
inner power of the individual, or in other words, in the ego's 
capacity to maintain a relative distance from the various distinct 
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forms of identity that he/she has to assume according to the dif-
ferent levels and phases of his/her social life. One must therefore 
acknowledge that a certain conception of identity as a stable and 
permanent form, established once and for all, has entered a state 
of crisis (cf. Levi-Strauss 1977). This is instead replaced by a more 
complex consideration of the inner dynamics which the ego, in its 
relative indefiniteness, maintains with the established forms of 
symbolic mediation which ensure each time the objective forms of 
identity necessary for social interaction (cf. Crespi 1985b). The 
construction of a personal identity appears today, therefore, pri-
marily as an ability to negotiate social identities internally, or, in 
other words, as a process of exploration of various possibilities, 
and different practical solutions (cf. Turner 1968: 1075; Goffman 
1961; Luhman 1979; Berger, Berger & Kellner 1973: 62 ss.). 
The third level of analysis of the present socio-cultural situa-
tion is of a more specific sociological character and concerns direct-
ly the process of the increasing differentiation of the spheres of 
social life and the consequent fragmentation of the social system 
into various specialized sub-systems (cf. Luhman 1975). This situ-
ation has been interpreted by Habermas (1981a, b) in terms of the 
growing divergence between social system and life-world 
(Lebenswelt). 
With reference to Max Weber's critique of the concept of 
rationalization, Habermas emphasizes the fact that the objective-
technical processes of modernization connected with the develop -
ment of capitalism tend to reduce the possibilities for human 
experience offered by the rationalization of world views and 
social forms. The assumption central to Habermas' analysis is 
that the process of cultural rationalization which took place dur-
ing the history of humanity can be depicted as a rational develop-
ment of world views and of codified cognitive structures, linked 
to the concrete transformations of means of production and forms 
of social organization. According to Habermas, the historical pro-
cess leading to capitalism has produced an increasing divergence 
between the reductional principles of functional-instrumental rea-
son which characterizes the structural logic of advanced industri-
al societies including the possibilities offered by the substantial 
rationalization processes, and the development of communicative 
socialization present in these same societies at the everyday-life-
world-level. Life-world represents for Habermas the widespread 
horizon within which are preserved and transmitted the interpre-
tations of preceding generations, the forms of symbolic mediation 
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by means of which traditional cultures are maintained and repro-
duced, social integration is strengthened, and personal identities 
are confirmed (cf. Habermas 1981b, II: 182 ss.). Since, however, 
social action develops not only in the symbolic space of the life-
world but also in that of the functional organization of social sys-
tems, as "systemically stabilized action-contexts of socially 
integrated groups" (II: 228), it is also necessary to analyze the 
dynamic relationship between life-world and functional systems 
as dimensions not reducible to one another. 
As is well known, functionalist systems are characterized in 
Parsons' theory as self-regulating action-contexts which coordi-
nate actions around specific mechanisms or "media," such as 
money or power. However, the functionalist model, in Habermas' 
view, does not take sufficiently into account the distinctive char-
acteristics of the life-world, where processes of communicative 
action follow a logic which cannot be reduced to that of functional 
mechanisms (money /power) and cannot be replaced by the latter 
without serious pathological consequences. While the concepts of 
system and life-world were originally co-extensive, subsequently 
social evolution has produced an ever-increasing differentiation 
of these two dimensions: the social system has developed accord-
ing to principles of functional and instrumental rationality 
through a growing distinction between power structures and kin-
ship structures (formation of the state apparatus as different from 
that of the clan structures) and an increasingly autonomous mar-
ket economy in respect to the local spheres of life. This process of 
differentiation ended up reducing the life-world to the status of 
one sub-system among others (cf. ibid., II: 229 ss.). Since social 
systems remain nonetheless linked by specific institutional com-
plexes to the life-world, the differentiation between the two levels 
creates serious contradictions and imbalance. While rationaliza-
tion of the social level has developed, on the one hand, in increas-
ing degrees of organizational, economic, administrative and 
political complexity, rationalization of life-world has been charac-
terized, on the other hand, by the separation among different 
spheres of value and by the logical advancement of levels of 
learning . As a matter of fact, the evolution which has affected 
life-world is characterized, according to Habermas, by the pro-
gressive distinction between subjective and social world, further-
ing the transition from an egocentric, absolutist understanding of 
the world to a decentralized and relativized understanding of it 
(Habermas 1981a, I: 105-6). 
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The dynamic relationship established between the processes 
of rationalization at the social-system level (as an increase of its 
complexity based on functional values of production and control) 
and the process of rationalization at the life-world level (as a 
development of creative and critical ability) can be analyzed in 
terms of its circularity: rationalization of the life-world is a condi-
tion of the increase in complexity of the system, but this in turn 
influences the life-world, reducing its potentialities ("inner-colo-
nization of the life-world," in ibid., II: 517 ss.). 
Reductionist mediation of the life-world through system 
imperatives causes pathological effects 
insofar as critical disequilibria in material reproduction [ ... ] can 
be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic repro-
duction of the life-world (i.e., of subjectively experienced, identity-
threatening crises or pathologies). (Ibid., II: 452 ss.) 
In point of fact, when the mechanisms of monetarization and bur-
eaucratization of the economic and administrative spheres exceed 
their role and penetrate the spheres pertaining to the life-world of 
cultural transmission, socialization and personal identity, the free-
dom of the processes of communicative action are seriously com-
promised. 
On the basis of the analysis of interaction processes between 
life-world and communicative action on the one hand, and social 
system and instrumental action on the other, Habermas maintains 
that the evils of the societies of late capitalism can be identified 
with the tendency of systematic mechanisms to intrude into the 
life-world and with the tendency of functional models to replace 
the forms that characterize communicative rationality. Taking 
Marx's analysis as a reference, Habermas explains this tendency 
as a product of the inner logic of the processes of accumulation 
and valorization of capital. In advanced capitalist societies , with 
the development of the Welfare State and state economic interven-
tion, control of the contradictions present on an economic level 
and in class conflict can be maintained by displacing the tensions 
into other spheres of social life, where the conflict appe ars in 
forms which cannot be linked directly to class structures. In this 
way new conflicting forms and new movements appear which 
reveal, in Habermas' view, the contrast between the all-inclusive 
tendencies of the social system and the possibilities for autonomy 
and self-reflection which have opened up today in communica-
tive action by virtue of logical development (cf. ibid.: 489 ss.). 
Habermas ' concept of life-world as the ideal base for com-
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municative action gives rise to numerous questions. In the dual-
ism between life-world and the social system, Ferdinand Tennies' 
society-community dichotomy seems to reappear in a renewed 
version: in Habermas' analysis the life-world, as a place of com-
municative action , is shown as the domain which establishes sub-
stantial rationality, while the functional rationality of systemic 
structures is seen as the principal source of social tensions and 
alienations. This distinction can be useful in showing how, on a 
global societal level, the determinate forms of mediation, in order 
to control collective action, must necessarily have a greater degree 
of generality and absoluteness: they are therefore more abstract 
and less flexible with regard to the more differentiated and open 
forms of mediation connected with the experience of the life-
world. The contrast between the two levels in terms of the dis-
parate quality of their relative principles of rationality appears, 
however, in Habermas' analysis once again to be dictated mainly 
by the needs of an absolute foundation of value rather than by 
empirical experience. While acknowledging the interdependence 
between life-world and the social system, the logic of power and 
money tends to be attributed exclusively to the social system 
structure, without equal recognition of its connections with the 
forces at work in the life-world: the idea of colonization by the 
social system of the latter does not give, in its unidirectionality, 
adequate relevance to the dimensions of life-world which con-
tribute to the development of the social system. To say that the 
tensions of present society are the product of the displacement 
into the life-world of the tensions and conflicts of the systemic 
structure-linked to the logic of the development of mature capi-
talism in its economic and political aspects - seems to be an over -
ly simplistic interpretation (cf. Thompson 1983: 292 ss.), which 
runs the risk of idealizing the life-world. 
This does not alter the fact, however, that the present tenden-
cy towards a progressive differ entiation between the interaction 
processes of everyday life and the increasingly complex organiza-
tional level of the social system as such is an actual characteristic 
to be taken into account in an analysis of the crisis of politics, 
together with the other aspects mentioned above. 
Another aspect I feel should be examined in order to under-
stand the specific meaning of the current crisis of politics in con-
temporary developed societies is the particular attitude towards 
the norms which seems to prevail in that kind of society. Much of 
the sociological research carried out in Italy in these last years on 
DIFFERENT/A 14 
youth movements and identity (see, for example, Garelli, Melucci, 
Sciolla, et al.) have emphasized, as I mentioned before, not only 
the fragmentation of social orders and the multiple and provision-
al nature of identity statuses, but above all what has been called 
the "expansion of possibilities" or "excess of opportunities" 
offered by contemporary developed societies. It could be 
inferred, therefore, that the relationship with the norms tends 
today, in a situation of relativization of symbolic orders, to be 
expressed according to a greater freedom of choice. It is in this 
perspective that the accent has been put on post-materialist val-
ues (Inglehart), on the increase in critical reflection, on the shift 
from needs of an acquisitive nature to those of self-realization 
(Altan, Sciolla, Ricolfi, Melucci), and on the accentuation of indi-
vidual rather than collective logic (Garelli), etc. 
On the other hand it is also true that, even apart from the 
episodes connected with terrorism, the considerable success of 
certain religious movements would seem to indicate a desire to 
return to absolute forms and certainties capable of reducing the 
complexity created by the excess of possibilities. How are we to 
interpret this phenomenon, which appears to swing between the 
opposing tendencies, on the one hand, of a lack of commitment 
and increase in critical reflexivity and, on the other hand, of 
involvement and fanaticism? 
Bearing in mind the various types of behavior which can be 
expressed, on the basis of an analysis of the action-norms relation-
ship, in terms of agreement or disagreement between the internal 
values of orientation and socially codified values, it can be sur -
mised that we find ourselves faced today with a real possibility of 
radical transformation of the attitude towards the norms, along 
the lines of what could be described as a pragmatism based on the 
recognition of conventionality of norms as such (a possibility which I 
have examined elsewhere in terms of an increase in the inner 
power of the subjects). However, a similar possibility seems 
today to be far from being realized. 
Apart from marginal cases which obviously cannot be 
ignored, what we are faced with today is neither a situation of 
widespread anomie-since the accentuation of the individualistic 
dimension seems, all things considered, to allow the individual 
(perhaps due to a reinforcement of the inner power of the ego) to 
move with relative ease among institutional norms-nor an ideal 
situation characterized by an effective increase in the ability to 
make choices and projects on the basis of new forms of social soli-
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darity and a new awareness of the kind of cultural-social transfor-
mations taking place. Thus the more diffused contemporary type 
of political behavior seems to be characterized by discordance 
between subjective and social values in the presence of relatively 
flexible social structures, within which no apparent actions 
emerge to contest the social system as such: a form of behavior 
determined primarily on the basis of specific interests (whether 
individual or group) and which tends to make the best use, in an 
unscrupulous and instrumental way, of opportunities as they 
arise . A kind of behavior which I would define as instrumental-
opportunistic without implying by this any moral judgment: it is 
simply a question of interpreting a pattern of behavior which can 
in no way be judged either positively or negatively, but which 
must be assessed in its specificity. The relative weakening of the 
totalizing character of the normative-symbolic representations, 
linked to a situation of progressive differentiation of the social 
structure, seems to bring about an accentuation of the ability, pre-
sent to some extent in every kind of society, to go through the insti-
tutional orders in the pursuit of particular aims, without 
necessarily altering the orders themselves. 
Such a hypothesis could facilitate an understanding of the 
characteristics of many religious and ecological movements 
which, despite the potential tendency in some of them towards 
new fideistic forms which arouse fanaticism, never lose sight of 
practical strategic objectives. In this context, instead of referring 
to a simple estrangement from politics, the question should be 
asked whether we are faced with new pragmatic procedures in 
politics, directly linked to new social and individual realities. 
The political function tends to exist increasingly as a prag-
matic action tied to specific interests, rather than as an action 
characterized to a significant degree by ideological choices and 
capable of producing general consensus. The political institu-
tions, having lost all their sacred characters, are now revealed as 
forms of normative-symbolic mediation in which the degree of 
reduction of the complex needs of individual and collective expe-
rience inevitably appears very high. On the political level, any 
determination of meaning must be simplified according to the 
concrete forms of "average" feasibility, which are always exces-
sively limited as regards the differentiated demands expressed at 
other levels and in other forms of mediation (life-world level), rel-
atively autonomous as regards politics even if they remain inter-
related to it. 
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In this situation, politics appears to have lost to a great extent 
its capacity to grant an identity to individuals and groups, and 
consequently also the possibility of existing as a privileged 
instance of social belonging and solidarity. In recognizing the 
plurality of the various dimensions at work in the social system, 
politics would take its place, therefore, alongside other spheres of 
sense, foregoing its existence as a privileged form of social inte-
gration. The problem appears to lie in ensuring that the recogni-
tion of the pluralism of the spheres of sense does not lead to the 
disintegration of the social order and the accentuation of the cor-
porative dimensions of political action. The risk is that politics' 
loss of charisma, limiting its potential as a decisive unifying 
moment, would lead to a levelling of society as a result of the 
dominance of the normative dimension over that of projection. A 
progressive disintegration of social unity through the intensifica-
tion of sectorial conflict could ensue. In these conditions political 
power, instead of being a function of general management of the 
fundamental contradictions of society, with a long-term capacity 
for projection and decision-making, takes on the simple function 
of maintenance of the status quo, into an administrative role, by 
means of compromises between the different social forces and 
patronage concessions. 
Given present conditions, it does not seem desirable that 
political power, apart from its role as moderator of conflict and 
guarantor of normative order, should try to regain its capacity to 
interpret the evolutionary processes at work in social reality and 
to promote the latter's potentialities, through a return to charis-
matic leadership, as some sociologists seem to think (cf. Cavalli 
1981). Nor does it seem possible that politics could today be con-
sidered as a totalizing moment, unless as a result of a profound 
regression, due to the state of uncertainty caused by the same cri-
sis of identity and of unifying ideologies. It would appear thus 
that an effort should be made to rethink, on the basis of an ade-
quate interpretation of the above-mentioned socio-cultural char -
acteristics, the role of politics in order to promote a renewed 
capacity of society for self-definition and expression. The result 
of this should be pursued by an increase on a collective level in 
the degree of understanding of the evolutionary significance of 
the processes of social differentiation and cultural relativization at 
work today, and through an increase in collective power as such, 
if by power we mean the capacity to direct-pragmatically and 
without illusory, ideological deformations - the contradictions 
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which inevitabl y arise in every social system. 
In this perspective, politics would find a new specificity 
no longer as an ideologically based form which ascribes identi-
ty and produces consensus, but as a place of practical commu-
nications among different social forces and as a particular 
medium by which a community formulates projects on the 
basis of shared interpretations and concrete choices, taking into 
account its own real needs. 
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